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Abstract 
Synesthetic experiences of color have been traditionally conceptualized as a 
perceptual phenomenon. However, recent evidence suggests a role of higher 
order cognition in the formation of synesthetic experiences. Here we discuss 
how synesthetic experiences of color differ from and influence veridical color 
processing, and how non-perceptual processes such as imagery and color 
memory might play a role in eliciting synesthetic color experience. 
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Introduction 
Synesthetes experience everyday life very differently to typical individuals. For 
them, words can have distinctive flavors, colors can accompany sounds, or 
days of the week can be represented in intricate spatial arrangements (Ward, 
2013). Synesthesia is defined as a condition where stimulation of one sensory 
modality elicits involuntary additional percepts within the same or different 
modality (Sagiv, 2004). For instance, in grapheme-color synesthesia 
achromatic letters or numbers (inducers) trigger secondary color experiences 
(concurrents). While many types of synesthesia have been identified so far 
(e.g. Simner, Mayo, & Spiller, 2009; Ward, Banissy, & Jonas, 2008; Simner & 
Ward, 2003), grapheme-color is one of the most common forms of 
synesthesia (Ward, 2013), therefore much of our discussion will involve 
findings concerning this synesthetic sub-type. 
 
Although many prominent theories of synesthesia advocate it to be a 
perceptual phenomenon elicited by sensory input (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 
2001b; Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001), several findings support the notion 
that construing synesthesia in purely perceptual terms cannot fully describe 
the nature of this condition. Here we discuss this evidence to further elucidate 
to what extent synesthetic color experiences are perceptually based. 
Specifically, we first discuss different theoretical models of synesthesia as 
well as the mechanisms underlying aspects of synesthetic and veridical color 
processing. Subsequently we examine the nature of synesthetic inducers and 
how non-perceptual processes such as imagery and color memory might play 
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a role in eliciting synesthetic color experiences. We then discuss how 
synesthetic color can inform our knowledge on typical color processing. 
 
1. Neural basis of synesthesia for color 
Three influential hypotheses of the mechanisms underlying synesthesia are 
the cross-activation (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001b), cortical disinhibition 
(Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2008) and the re-
entrant feedback theory (Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy & Merikle, 2001).  The cross-
activation model states that increased connections between neighboring brain 
areas such as the visual word form area (VWFA) and color sensitive regions 
of the brain (e.g. hV4) provide the basis for synesthetic experiences. Recent 
cross-activation accounts also highlight an important role of attentional 
processes located in the parietal lobe, which allow for binding information 
from these two areas into one coherent percept (Hubbard, Brang, & 
Ramachandran, 2011).  
 
Disinhibition accounts advocate that a lack of inhibition from multisensory 
(Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) or executive control regions (Cohen 
Kadosh, Henik, Catena, Walsh, & Fuentes, 2009) to unisensory brain areas is 
the source of synesthesia. In a related context it has also been suggested that 
synesthesia arises as a consequence of local differences in cortical excitation 
through mechanisms akin to perceptual unmasking (Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 
2007; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2008).  
 
4 
 
The re-entrant feedback model (Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy & Merikle, 2001) 
suggests a crosstalk between form and color sensitive brain regions but at the 
same time highlights the importance of top-down processes exerted by 
feedback connections from brain regions involved in conceptual 
representation to those involved in color processing, thus emphasizing the 
essential role of the activation of the conceptual representation of the inducer 
(grapheme) in the elicitation of the synesthetic experience of color concurrent.  
 
While these different theoretical models can explain the mechanisms 
underlying synesthesia construed as a perceptual condition, their ability to 
account for the conceptual phenomena of synesthetic experiences is not 
uniform. The cross-activation theory (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001b) 
acknowledges the involvement of top down mechanisms in the binding of the 
inducer and concurrent, however it does not regard this process to play a role 
in evoking synesthetic experiences. Similarly, the disinhibited feedback theory 
does not consider the possibility of purely concept driven synesthetic 
concurrents (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). On the other hand, the re-
entrant model postulates that top down processes such as categorization of 
an inducer play an essential part in the elicitation of the synesthetic 
experiences (Smilek, Dixon, Cudahy & Merikle, 2001) and as such can 
accommodate the findings of conceptually induced synesthesia.  
 
To examine these models, one stream of research has investigated if 
synesthesia is associated with structural brain differences in color relevant 
brain areas. Using diffusion tensor imaging technique (DTI) Rouw and Scholte 
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(2007) found synesthesia to be linked with increased structural connectivity in 
the right inferior temporal cortex. Others, however, failed to find similar results 
(e.g. Jancke, Beeli, Eulig, & Hanggi, 2009; Hupé, Bordier, & Dojat, 2012). A 
similar pattern has emerged from studies using voxel-based-morphometry 
(VBM) to examine gray matter differences between synesthetic who 
experience color as their evoked sensation; with some (Jancke et al., 2009; 
Weiss & Fink, 2009; Banissy, Stewart, Griffiths, Muggleton, Walsh, Ward, & 
Kanai, 2012), but not all (e.g. Hupé et al.,2012; Rouw & Scholte, 2010) 
studies reporting synesthesia to be associated with increased gray matter 
volume in brain areas linked to veridical color processing in typical adults. 
Notably, in the studies that do report gray matter differences in neural regions 
close to those previously associated with veridical color processing, the 
regions responding to color were not functionally localized in their subjects; 
given inter-individual variability in cortical color responsiveness it is therefore 
difficult to disentangle the exact relationship between brain structure and 
function.  
 
The findings of functional neuroimaging studies are also inconsistent. Some 
fMRI studies report hV4 activation in response to both colored and achromatic 
stimuli inducing synesthetic color experiences (Hubbard, Arman, 
Ramachandran, & Boynton, 2005; Sperling, Prvulovic, Linden, Singer & Stirn, 
2006). Hubbard and colleagues (2005) also found that the strength of hV4 
activation to achromatic inducers in grapheme-color synesthetic was 
mediated by their performance on a visual crowding task where participants 
were required to identify an achromatic target grapheme presented in the 
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visual periphery and surrounded by other graphemes printed in black ink (the 
greater the activation, the better the performance; suggesting that real and 
synesthetic color processing might be driven by the same mechanisms). 
However, other studies failed to replicate these findings, putting in question 
the idea that these processes are analogous (Sinke, Neufeld, Emrich, Dillo, 
Bleich, Zedler & Szycik, 2012; Hupe et al., 2012; Rouw and Scholte, 2010). 
Indeed, recently the reliability of the findings suggesting that synesthetic color 
is handled by color-sensitive brain regions  has been further undermined by 
Hupe and colleagues (2012) who pointed out that studies reporting functional 
neural activity in regions of the brain linked to color processing during the 
experience of synesthesia tended to apply liberal statistical thresholds. In their 
own fMRI study, Hupe and colleagues (2012) investigated whether the brain 
regions responsive to real color and those activated by synesthetic color 
overlapped in a group of grapheme-color synesthetes. Their findings indicated 
that none of the areas recruited in veridical color processing, which were 
individually identified for each of the participants by means of full retinotopic 
mapping, were activated by a synesthetic color; suggesting that it is unlikely 
that synesthetic and real color share identical neural mechanisms.  In this 
regard, neuroimaging has struggled to clarify the extent to which synesthetic 
and veridical color processing rely on common or distinct mechanisms. 
 
2. Is real color processing and synesthetic color the same thing? 
 
Aside from neuroimaging, psychophysical studies have also been employed 
to investigate whether synesthetic color has the properties of the real color. A 
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number of psychophysical studies have demonstrated that synesthetic color 
does not produce the color constancy effect (Erskine, Mattingley, & Arnold, 
2012), simultaneous color contrast (Nijboer, Gebuis, Te Pas, & Van Der 
Smagt, 2011) or chromatic adaptation (Hong & Blake, 2008). Some reports 
have, however, indicated that synesthetic color and real color share common 
characteristics such as the ability to produce the watercolor illusion (Kim & 
Blake, 2005) or to influence bistable apparent motion (Kim, Blake, & Palmeri, 
2006). Nevertheless, these results have been questioned on their 
methodological basis (Chiou & Rich, 2014) and thus need to be treated with 
caution.  
 
Similarly, although initial reports suggested that synesthetic color might pop-
out of a display of achromatic graphemes and thus facilitate the visual search 
just like real color does (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a), subsequent 
studies failed to replicate this finding. While some found synesthetes to be 
better than controls on the visual search tasks (Palmeri, Blake, Marois, 
Flanery, & Whetsell, 2002; Laeng, Svartdal, & Oelmann, 2004; Ward,  Jonas, 
Dienes, & Seth, 2010; Rich and Karstoft, 2013), their results indicated an 
involvement of attentional resources in this process thus refuting the 
possibility that synesthetic color is a result of low-level, pre-attentive 
processes and can pop-out like real color (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). It has 
also been suggested that implicit processing of visual stimuli is not sufficient 
for synesthetic concurrents to occur, and that only by consciously identifying 
the inducers it is possible to elicit them (Mattingley, Rich, Yelland, & 
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Bradshaw, 2001). Based on these findings it appears that the mechanisms 
underlying synesthetic and real color are not identical. 
 
3. Percept or concept? - characteristics of an inducer 
 
In order to further examine whether synesthetic color is a perceptual 
phenomenon other studies have sought to determine if physical 
characteristics of inducers would impact on synesthetic experiences of color. 
A number of studies reported that low-level physical features of inducers can 
influence synesthetic color experiences. For instance, high frequency fonts 
give rise to greater intensity of synesthetic colors compared to low frequency 
fonts (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2003; Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). Similarly, 
upper case letters can produce more vivid color experiences than those 
printed in lower case (A vs a) (Witthoft & Winawer, 2006). It has also been 
shown that graphemes that are similar in shape (e.g., E, 3) compared to those 
which are not (e.g., E, X) can be colored in a similar fashion (Eagleman, 2010; 
Brang, Rouw, Ramachandran, & Coulson, 2011).  
 
Although these reports suggest that visual properties of inducers might 
influence synesthetic experiences, other findings indicate that the appearance 
of inducers has little impact on synesthetic colors. For instance, an inducer 
typically elicits different synesthetic colors depending on its context, e.g. 
whether it is perceived as a letter or a digit like in case of the grapheme ‘I’ 
(Dixon, Smilek, Duffy, Zanna, & Merikle, 2006). Similarly, different physical 
variants of the same letter (e.g., a, a, A, a) tend to consistently produce the 
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same synesthetic color (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001). Additionally, 
although with some exceptions (e.g. see Arnold, Wegener, Brown & 
Mattingley, 2012; Simner, 2012) commonly the modality of the inducer does 
not seem to play an important role as synesthetic report color concurrents 
irrespective of whether the inducer is heard, read, or merely thought about 
(Rich, Bradshaw & Mattingley, 2005).  
 
These findings demonstrate that while occasionally purely perceptual features 
of an inducer might influence concurrents, for a number of synesthetes it is 
higher level cognitive constructs that elicit color experiences; leading some to 
suggest that synesthesia is in fact a form of ‘ideasthesia’ (Jürgens & Nikolic, 
2012) 
 
4. Can a color concurrent be experienced in the absence of an inducer? 
 
The aforementioned studies suggest that it is the conceptual rather than 
perceptual dimension of the inducing stimulus that triggers synesthetic 
experiences of color. This idea has been addressed in a number of different 
studies that sought to determine if it is necessary for the inducer to be 
physically present in order to produce synesthetic experiences.  
 
For example, in a study carried out by Dixon, Smilek, Cudahy and Merikle 
(2000) a synesthete was visually presented with a simple arithmetic task such 
as e.g. ‘2+5 =’ followed by a color patch. The task was to first name the color 
patch and to subsequently give a solution to the problem. The authors 
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reported that the synesthete was quicker at naming the color patch when it 
was congruent with the synesthetic color of the solution and slower when 
these colors did not match. These results have been subsequently replicated 
in the auditory domain in a study carried out by Jansari, Spiller and Redfern 
(2006), where participants heard rather then saw examples such as ‘2+5 = 
yellow’. These findings suggest that it is the concept of the inducer rather than 
physical properties that triggers synesthetic experiences of color.  
 
Additionally, implicit bidirectionality has been demonstrated in many studies. 
For instance, Brugger et al., (2004) reported that digit-color synesthetes 
compared to controls had faster left-hand responses to colors associated with 
small digits and faster right-hand responses for colors representing large 
numbers, suggesting that these synesthetes could access numerical 
magnitude information through their color associations. Similar results have 
been found in the domain of lexical processing. For example, Weiss et al. 
(2009) asked grapheme-color synesthetes and controls to perform a word 
completion task where either high or low-frequency words could be generated 
by inserting a different first letter. A color patch consistent with the individual 
synesthetes’ color concurrents replaced the space where first letter would 
appear, biasing them to generate low-frequency words significantly more 
often than the control participants. This was interpreted as evidence for 
implicit bidirectional priming. Behavioral data demonstrating bidirectional 
nature of synesthetic experience has also been supported by neuroimaging 
evidence which suggested that color can activate the number form area of the 
fusiform gyrus in a grapheme-color synesthete, for whom synesthesia 
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typically manifests itself in a uni-directional fashion i.e. digits elicit color 
concurrents (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2007). Recently 
bidirectional priming in synesthesia has also been demonstrated across 
different sensory modalities (vision and audition; Paffen, Van der Smagt and 
Nijboer, 2015), further supporting the claim that although subjective 
synesthetic experiences are typically reported to follow the unidirectional path 
from the inducer to the concurrent, it is possible to induce priming in the 
opposite direction. More importantly, these findings suggest that synesthesia 
relies on higher-order representations rather than low-level sensory 
processing.’ 
 
Further evidence in support of the idea that it is possible to elicit synesthetic 
concurrents in the absence of a sensory inducer has been provided by 
Nikolić, Juergens, Rothen, Meier, and Mroczko (2011), and Rothen et al. 
(2013), who reported a new form of synesthesia where swimming styles 
evoke color concurrents. Their findings suggest that the proprioceptive input 
associated with different swimming styles is not essential to elicit synesthetic 
colors, instead the mere concept of it, induced with photographs (Nikolić et al., 
2011) or pictograms of different swimming styles (Rothen et al., 2013) is 
sufficient to evoke color concurrents. 
 
 Grapheme-color synesthesia might also be elicited in even more extreme 
circumstances. For instance, synesthetes who have lost their sight and thus 
have no means of visually processing the graphemes still report very vivid 
color experiences triggered by letters, numbers, words or Braille characters 
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(Steven & Blakemore, 2004).  Neuroimaging studies using fMRI have further 
validated these subjective reports by demonstrating that listening to words 
inducing synesthetic color experiences in blind synesthetes is associated with 
activity in color sensitive brain areas (Steven, Hansen, & Blakemore, 2006; 
Niccolai,  van Leeuwen, Blakemore, Stoerig, 2012). However, as the 
experimenters were not able to localize these brain regions there is no 
guarantee that the reported activation in color areas is actually related to 
veridical color processing. Although these findings were interpreted by Steven 
and colleagues (2006) as evidence for perceptual nature of synesthetic 
colors, others (Niccolai et al., 2012) suggested an alternative explanation, 
namely that synesthesia resembles object color knowledge and imagery.  
 
5. Is synesthetic color imagined? 
 
Synesthetes have previously been found to show enhanced self-reported 
imagery vividness measured with the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Barnett & Newell, 2008). There is also evidence 
showing that high scores on VVIQ are associated with greater activation 
within the early visual system during mental imagery tasks (Cui, Jeter, Yang, 
Montague, & Eagleman, 2007). In a neuroimaging study conducted by Rich, 
Williams, Puce, Syngeniotis, Howard, Mcglone and Mattingley (2006) 
grapheme-color synesthetes and controls were asked to perform a voluntary 
color imagery task which required participants to make color judgements 
about objects in grey scale photographs. Participants were also shown letters 
inducing synesthetic colors and asked to perform a localization task. The aim 
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of this study was to examine neural mechanisms underlying color experiences 
arising in the absence of veridical color input. Their results indicated that 
voluntary color imagery was associated with hV4 activation both in 
synesthetes and non-synesthetes, while synesthetic color was linked to neural 
activity in the left medial lingual gyrus. These findings suggest that synesthetic 
and imagined color may be supported by different brain structures. 
Interestingly, in view of this others (e.g. Mattingley, 2009); Chiou and Rich, 
2014) have suggested that previous reports of enhanced hV4 activation in 
synesthesia might in fact reflect mental imagery rather than a perceptual 
process. Further support for the idea of V4 activity being linked to imagery 
was provided by Sinke and colleagues (2012) who found no difference 
between synesthetes and controls in hV4 activation in response to colored 
and black letters and pseudo-letters, when both groups were matched in 
terms of scores on VVIQ. These findings suggest that synesthetic color is a 
separate phenomenon from real color perception, although it probably entails 
much more than mere imagination. 
 
6. Is synesthetic color a memory? 
 
The suggestion that synesthesia is a form of  color memory  is consistent with 
previous findings demonstrating that synesthetes are better than controls on 
tests of color recognition memory as well as memory tests inducing 
synesthetic experiences (Yaro & Ward, 2007; Mills, Innis, Westendorf, 
Owsianiecki, & McDonald, 2006; Rothen &  Meier, 2010). There is also some 
evidence suggesting that grapheme-color synesthetes have enhanced 
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memory for stimuli that do not trigger their synesthesia 
(Ward,  Hovard,  Jones, & Rothen, 2013; Rothen, Meier, & Ward, 2012).  
 
Results of structural neuroimaging studies using voxel-based morphometry 
also suggest that grapheme-color synesthetes, at least those classified as 
associators, have greater gray matter volume in the hippocampus and 
parahippocampal gyri, which are brain regions involved in memory processes. 
Functional imaging results confirmed these results by showing increased 
activity in these areas in the same group of synesthetes (Rouw & Scholte, 
2010). 
 
Rouw and Scholte (2010) found projector synesthetes to have structural 
differences in other brain regions (e.g. increased gray matter volume in V1) 
than those classified as associators, suggesting that experiencing internal vs 
external concurrents differs in terms of underlying neural substrates. Van 
Leeuwen, den Ouden and Hagoort (2011) reported bottom-up activation in 
projector synesthetes and top-down influences in associators determined 
using dynamic causal modelling, providing further evidence for the claim that 
differences in phenomenal experiences between projector and associator 
synesthetes are reflected in different neural mechanisms. Taking into account 
these individual differences, it is possible that the potential involvement of 
memory would appear more crucial to associator synesthetes. 
 
The hypothesis that synesthesia involves recollection of color rather than 
actual color perception was directly tested in a study carried out by Arnold and 
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colleagues (2012). The authors recruited grapheme—color synesthetes who 
only experienced colors for read, but not heard inducers. In this experiment 
participants were presented both with printed and spoken graphemes. Using a 
color picker they had to adjust the color of the graphemes that triggered, or in 
case of the auditory condition, that would normally trigger synesthetic 
experiences if seen. Their results indicated no difference in the precision of 
the color matching between the two conditions, which was interpreted by the 
authors as evidence for the idea that automatically induced synesthetic color 
resembles color recalled from memory. In addition, they ran a control 
experiment which indicated that the precision of matching real visible colors 
was much greater to recollected colors. Their findings are consistent with 
previous reports indicating that the precision of color memory is much lower 
compared to real-time color perception (Knill & Richards, 1996). Taken 
together these results suggest that if triggered in real time or recalled from 
memory synesthetic color is subject to greater variability and less precision 
than real color perception. Therefore, synesthetic color appears to behave 
more like color memory than real color perception.  
 
7. Can synesthetic color tell us anything about real color processing? 
 
While synesthetic experiences might involve visual imagery or color memory, 
grapheme-color synesthesia has been shown to be linked to broader 
differences in perceptual processing. For example, psychophysical studies 
examining color processing of stimuli that do not evoke synesthesia have 
reported superior processing of color in synesthetes who experience color 
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concurrents (Banissy, Walsh, & Ward, 2009; Banissy, Tester, Muggleton, 
Janik, Davenport, Franklin, Walsh, & Ward, 2013; Yaro & Ward 2007; Arnold 
et al., 2012). For example, we have shown that color synesthetes outperform 
non-synesthetes on a visual search paradigm in which targets and distractors 
differ in a single color dimension (hue, saturation, or luminance), but do not 
differ when discriminating line orientation (Banissy et al., 2013).   
 
Further, EEG findings suggest that synesthetes who experience color as their 
evoked sensation show perceptual processing differences to stimuli that bias 
parvocellular pathways (Barnett, Fox, Molholm, Kelly, Shalgi, Mitchell & 
Newell, 2008). In that study, Barnett and colleagues examined neural 
responses of linguistic-color synesthetes to Gabor patches varying in spatial 
frequency and stimuli of various luminance contrasts. Their results indicated 
that stimuli, which do not induce synesthesia, but selectively bias 
parvocellular pathways of the visual system (Derrington & Lennie, 1984; 
Kaplan, 1991), were associated with enhanced cortical responsiveness. 
These findings would appear to fit with evidence that synesthetes who 
experience color show heightened perceptual processing of color, however it 
is of note that the perceptual advantage in color processing shown by color 
synesthetes has been shown to be present for dimensions of hue, luminance, 
and saturation (Banissy et al., 2013); implying that synesthetes show 
perceptual processing advantages for stimuli that do not rely solely upon 
parvocellular projections (e.g. Lee, Pokorny, Smith, Martin, & Valberg, 1990). 
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 Another broader perceptual difference that we have recently observed in 
synesthetes who experience color as their evoked sensation are elevated 
motion coherence thresholds (i.e. a reduction in motion processing abilities; 
Banissy et al., 2013). Using a different group of participants from those that 
were found to differ on the color visual search task described above, we 
compared color synesthetes’ and non-synesthetes’ abilities to detect global 
motion direction using random-dot kinematograms. We observed reduced 
performance in synesthetes relative to non-synesthetes. We interpreted these 
findings in the context of principles that govern interactions between color and 
motion in non-synesthetes. Moreover, non-invasive brain stimulation 
experiments suggest that brain regions involved in motion and color 
processing (e.g. hV5 / MT and hV4) can mutually inhibit one another (Ellison, 
Battelli, Cowey, & Walsh, 2003; Walsh, Ellison, Battelli, & Cowey, 1998). For 
example, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to hV5 / MT results in 
enhanced color and form perception and simultaneous suppression of motion 
processing (Ellison et al., 2003; Walsh et al., 1998). This has been interpreted 
in the context of a competition for resources between motion and color areas 
in the visual system (Ellison et al., 2003; Walsh et al., 1998). We suggest that 
a bias towards color processing in synesthesia may mediate this interaction 
leading to heightened color, but reduced motion perception in synesthetes 
who experience color as their evoked sensation.  
 
In this context, synesthesia may be useful to help inform us about principles 
that govern typical perceptual interactions. For example, the findings of 
increased color, but reduced motion processing in synesthetes who 
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experience color as their evoked sensation raises the question of the extent to 
which the perceptual profile that we observed in synesthetes is present in 
non-synesthetes. That is to say, if an individual has elevated color processing 
does this come at a cost for motion processing or vice versa? If so, this would 
suggest a clear way in which synesthesia may help to inform studies on 
typical visual processing (see McCarthy & Caplovitz, 2014 for a similar 
discussion). 
 
Concluding remarks 
While recent evidence suggest that the mechanisms involved in synesthetic 
colors resemble those involved in imagery and recollections of color, rather 
than those recruited when seeing real color, they by no means question the 
reality of synesthesia. There is an abundance of evidence suggesting that 
synesthesia is a percept-like, authentic, involuntary and automatic experience 
(Sagiv & Ward, 2006; Ward, 2013), however existing theories need to be 
refined in order to accommodate recent findings indicating that the 
mechanisms underlying this intriguing phenomenon extend beyond 
mechanisms of perceptual processing. 
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